In this paper, we analyse the investment allocation and the downside risk faced by the retiring member of a defined contribution pension scheme, where optimal investment strategies (derived from a dynamic programming approach) have been adopted. The behaviour of the optimal investment strategy is analysed when changing the disutility function and the correlation between the assets. Three different risk measures are considered in analysing the final net replacement ratios achieved by the member: the probability of failing the target, the mean shortfall and a Value at Risk type measure. The replacement ratios encompass the financial and annuitization risks faced by the retiree. We consider the relationship between the risk aversion of the member and these different risk measures in order to understand better the choices confronting different categories of scheme member. We consider the case of a 2 assets portfolio, where the asset returns are correlated and consider the sensitivity of the results to the level of the correlation coefficient.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we derive and analyse the optimal investment strategy for a defined contribution pension scheme and consider the downside risk (in terms of net replacement ratio achieved at retirement) faced by the member of the scheme, thereby extending the model introduced in Vigna and Haberman (2001) .
The extensions introduced are essentially threefold:
1. we now consider the more general case of dependent assets; 2. we generalise the disutility function in such a way that deviations of the fund above the target are not penalised to the same degree as deviations below; and 3. we consider a sequence of targets which grow exponentially instead of linearly.
The downside risk has been studied by examining three risk measures: the probability of failing the target, the mean shortfall and the Value at Risk measure (VaR) at three different confidence levels (1%, 5% and 10%).
The annuity risk faced by the member has also been analysed through these risk measures by comparing the results relative to the net replacement ratio both in the case of a fixed conversion factor and in the case of a random conversion factor, which depends on the prevailing yield on the low risk asset.
THE MODEL

ASSUMPTIONS AND STRUCTURE
We consider a defined contribution pension scheme with a 2-asset portfolio, a high-risk and a lowrisk asset. The forces of interest of the 2 assets are assumed to be normally distributed and correlated at any time with a linear correlation factor ρ.
Contributions are paid in advance every year as a fixed proportion of the salary of the scheme's member. Taxation, expenses and decrements other than retirement are not taken into consideration.
The model is presented in discrete time and we assume that the portfolio is reallocated every year between the 2 assets, depending on the past history of the market returns and on the current size of the fund, which is compared to an a priori target. We then find the optimal investment allocation every year that minimises the deviations of the fund from these corresponding targets.
The fund at time t+1 is given by the following equation: f t : fund level at time t c: contribution rate y t : proportion of fund invested in the high-risk asset during year [t, t+1] µ t : real force of interest for the low-risk asset in year [t, t+1], assumed to be constant over the year [t, t+1] λ t : real force of interest for the high-risk asset in year [t, t+1], assumed to be constant over the year [t, t+1] We assume that there are no real salary increases and that for simplicity the salary is 1 each year.
The sequences {µ t } and {λ t } are supposed to be IID with normal distribution, while the annual forces of interest µ t and λ t are correlated with correlation factor ρ, constant for any t.
Therefore:
µ t ≈ N(µ, σ 1 2 ) and λ t ≈ N(λ, σ 2 2 ), where:
TARGETS
The member is assumed to join the scheme at time t=0 and contribute until retirement at time t=N, which is a time point that is fixed in advance.
Since the fund and contributions are invested in a 2-asset portfolio, we have chosen the yearly targets as the accumulated fund using a particular average of the rates of return of the 2 assets. We have considered three different cases: (a) the rate of return equal to µ, as though the fund were fully invested in the low risk asset; (b) the rate of return equal to the Chisini average of µ t and λ t relative to the expected return over one year of a portfolio invested equally in the 2 assets, as though the fund were invested half in the low risk and half in the high risk asset; (c) the rate of return equal to λ, as though the fund were fully invested in the high risk asset.
Therefore, the yearly target at time t is:
2) We set F 0 = f 0 , where f 0 is the fund held by the member when he/she joins the scheme (i.e. the transfer value, which may be zero).
THE PROBLEM
FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
We define the "cost" incurred by the fund at time t as follows: The use of target values in the cost function is supported by the analysis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . The target-based approach in decision making under uncertainty is investigated and supported also by Bordley and Li Calzi (2000) , although they present a more general model in which the targets are stochastic and the utility function is the probability of matching the target.
It may be argued that there is little scope for yearly targets between joining the scheme and retirement, since it may not be possible for the scheme member to change the annual contribution to the fund by either withdrawing money from the fund or paying additional money to the fund. A similar argument regarding decrements other than retirement, which are excluded from our model, could be advanced. In this case, the cost function should be defined only at retirement, and the actual fund compared with the final target only. We think that this different formulation of the problem is interesting and we will consider it in further research. The choice of having a target every year is adopted for reasons of mathematical tractability of the model as well as reasons of cautiousness (since in practice it would probably be easier to meet a final target if the path of the fund's growth were monitored at periodic intervals) 2 .
The cost defined by (4) and (5) is positive when the fund is below the target and above a certain level, which is equal to the target plus α, and negative between the target and this level. Intuitively, this means that the deviations below the target are penalised, while the deviations above the target are rewarded, until a certain level (linked to the target), after which they are penalised again. The economic interpretation of this choice is that the possibility of gaining from high market returns are incentivised, but, when the fund becomes too large in relation to the target, the trade-off between risk and return means that the portfolio is cautiously invested.
Indeed, equation 4) can be rewritten as
so that it is clear that the "real" target being pursued by the model is , following the definition given above. 2 It should be noticed, however, that the different weight given to F t and F N (1 and θ≥1) reflects the greater importance of the final target in comparison with the yearly ones. risk aversion factors, so that we are considering individuals with different risk profiles. In fact, it can be shown (see Pratt 1964 , Owadally 1998 ) that an individual's risk aversion can be measured
individual's disutility (or loss) function, where the relationship between utility and disutility functions is: u(x)= −al(y)+b (a>0) and the relationship between loss and gain is: x+y=constant.
The disutility function considered here is l(y) = y 2 + αy (with the loss being y = F t −f t ), and therefore the resulting risk aversion is:
We observe not only that the risk aversion depends on the value of α, but also that it is decreasing when α is increasing, which means that lower values of α represent more risk averse individuals and vice versa.
We also observe that, in our model if α → 0, i.e. for very risk averse individuals, the target pursued tends to F t Instead, if α → ∞, i.e. for risk neutral individuals (A(y) = 0 means a null risk aversion, which is equivalent to risk neutrality), the target pursued tends to infinity, which means that the individual wants to make as much money as possible and always gain from higher than usual rates of return. Thus, F t and infinity are the lower and upper bounds for our real targets, when we consider the dependence between them and the risk aversion.
The cost at time N has a weight θ which can be greater than 1. When θ is greater than 1 more importance is given to the final target than to the yearly ones, and the rationale for this choice is that decrements other than retirement are not considered, and therefore the achievement of the final target -at retirement -can be considered more important than the achievement of the annual onesbefore retirement.
The total future cost at time t is obtained by discounting the future costs until N, using a subjective inter-temporal discount factor β as in Bellman and Kalaba (1965):
We define X t the σ−field generated by all information available at time t:
7)
X t = σ(f 0 , f 1 , ..., f t , y 0 , y 1 ,... y t-1 )
The value function at time t is defined as:
where π τ is the set of the future investment allocations, i.e.:
π t = {{y s } s = t, t+1,…,N-1 , : 0 ≤ y s ≤ 1} = {{y t , y t+1 ,…, y N-1 }, : 0 ≤ y s ≤ 1}
The investment allocation at time t, y t , is bounded between 0 and 1 because in our application short selling is not allowed.
We now find the future portfolio allocations that minimise the discounted future cost incurred by the fund.
BELLMAN'S OPTIMALITY PRINCIPLE
By applying Bellman's optimality principle we find:
Since the sequences {µ t } and {λ t } are supposed to be independent, {f t } is a Markov chain and: 
The dynamic programming problem, which we have defined, now becomes:
with boundary condition:
with {F t } t=1,…,N given by 2) above.
SOLUTION OF THE DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING PROBLEM
It can be proved by mathematical induction that :
where the sequences {P t } and {Q t } are given by the recursive relationship: 
where g µ (h) and g λ (h) are the moment generating functions of µ t and λ t and g µ,λ (h,k) is the moment generating function of the sum µ t + λ t .
A similar recursive relationship holds also for the sequence {R t }.
We also find that the optimal investment strategy is given by the following optimal investment allocation at time t:
with the same notation as before.
As noted earlier, in the application presented here, short selling is not allowed so that y t * is constrained to lie in the interval [0,1].
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN α AND THE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Looking at formula (12) above, we observe that α affects the sequence {Q t } only, which increases in value as α increases, leading to higher values of y t * , everything else being equal. Thus, we conclude that y t * increases on average as α increases. This is quite a reasonable result as we observe that α measures the risk aversion of the individual: a higher value of α corresponds to a lower risk aversion and leads to a higher fraction of the portfolio being invested in the riskier asset. This result is consistent also with intuition: by increasing α we are increasing both the penalisation of deviations below the target and the reward of deviations above, pushing the optimal portfolio to be invested more in riskier assets.
In particular, considering again the behaviour of the risk neutral investor (α → ∞), we see that, in our model, the risk neutral individual would invest the whole fund in the high risk asset and never switch into the low risk asset 3 . This asset allocation is supported by Blake et al (2001) , who argue that there is no evidence for the appropriateness of switching the fund into lower risk assets prior to retirement for the risk neutral individual, except for prudential reasons. However, in their analysis they do not consider individuals with different levels of risk aversion.
The meaning of α will be considered again later, when we discuss the simulation results.
SIMULATIONS FRAMEWORK
We have investigated the solution presented in section 3.3 for many scenarios, and have studied the sensitivity of the results to changes in the values of i, α and ρ by carrying out simulations.
We have also considered different generations of members by changing the value of N: 10, 20, 30
and 40 years to retirement. We assume that the member joins the scheme without a transfer value, which means that f 0 = 0. The contribution rate has been taken equal to 12%, the weight θ given to the final target has been chosen equal to 2 and the subjective inter-temporal discount factor β has been taken equal to 0.95.
The parameters of the asset returns chosen are: µ = 4%; λ = 10%; σ 1 = 5%; σ 2 = 15%.
Therefore, the value of i for determining the target values takes the three different values: 4%, r* as defined by 3) above (we observe that this value depends on the value of ρ, so it varies with the different values of the correlation factor) and 10%.
The correlation factor ρ takes the values -1, -1/2, 0, 1/2, 1; α takes many values, depending on the time to retirement.
The choice of different values of α for different durations is not arbitrary and is due to the fact that, since short selling is not allowed, the value of y t * stabilises at 1 after a certain value of α (we recall that y t * increases as α increases), which depends on the time to retirement (see section 5.3). For each scenario, 1000 simulations have been carried out by generating, for each simulation, the asset returns for N years (with N = 10, 20, 30, 40), and deriving, for each year, the optimal portfolio allocation derived by the model. In all the scenarios investigated, we use the same 1000 paths of returns and just change the other parameters like i, α and ρ. The rationale is that we wish to study the effect of changing the parameters and we do not wish the results to be affected (and confounded) by differences in the simulated paths of returns.
At the time of retirement, N, we have followed Vigna and Haberman (2001) and analysed the behaviour of the optimal investment strategy and studied how it changes if we change the targets, the disutility function, and the correlation factor ρ. Furthermore, we have calculated the fund accumulated, and also the net replacement ratio achieved by the member using two different methods, in order to measure the effect of the annuity risk on the retiree income. For the first method, we have converted the accumulated fund into an annuity using an actuarial value, a x , based on discounting at the expected return of the low risk asset (i.e. a fixed rate 4 ). For the second method,
we have used a variable annuity value, x ã , with discounting based on the average of the realised returns by the low risk asset in the last 5 years before retirement (setting a minimum of 2% in order to avoid unreasonable values in the case of a very poor performance of the low risk asset prior to retirement) and the variance of the low risk asset experienced during the N years of membership 5 .
In both cases, the annuity values depend on the returns on the low risk asset in order to represent the pricing behaviour of an insurance company, which would utilise the returns on matching fixed interest bonds in its calculations. For both methods, the mortality table used to calculate the actuarial value is the Italian projected mortality table (RGS48) and the retirement age has been chosen throughout to be x = 62.
Considering that the salary is 1 at any time, the net replacement ratio achieved using the first method of calculation is: 4 The discount factor used to calculate the annuity value a x is v=
, with µ = 4% and σ 1 = 5%. 5 The discount factor used to calculate the annuity value x ã is whereas the net replacement ratio achieved using the second method of calculation is:
The net replacement ratio achieved using the first method, b N , takes into account only the investment risk faced by the member 6 , as the conversion rate used is fixed. The net replacement ratio achieved using the second method, N b ("b N t" or "b N tilde" in the Figures that follow), takes into account also the annuity risk faced by the member 7 , as the conversion rate is linked to the simulated returns on the low risk asset in the years before retirement, and therefore it is variable, reflecting the simulated behaviour of the low risk asset.
We illustrate only the results for the 30 years' case (we note that the other durations, N=10, 20, 40,
give similar results). Similarly, we illustrate only the results for the VaR at 5% confidence level (we note that the VaR measures at 1% and 10% confidence levels give similar results).
MEASURES OF RISK
The downside risk faced by the member of the pension scheme is analysed by comparing the net replacement ratios achieved b N and N b with the target ratio B N . This is the fund target F N divided by an actuarial annuity value a x . In other words:
The idea of comparing the n.r.r. achieved with the target pursued is consistent with the analysis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , who observe that individuals perceive the outcomes as gains and losses relative to some neutral "reference point" (which, in our case, is the target).
The risk has been measured in the three different ways: 
RESULTS: THE OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY
We observe, as in Vigna and Haberman (2001) , that the optimal investment allocation y t * decreases on average with the time, which indicates the suitability of the lifestyle policy 8 for defined contribution pension schemes. This is illustrated by the results in Figures 1-3 (and by other detailed results not shown here but available on request from the authors).
The only exception to the suitability of the lifestyle strategy is when the individual is risk neutral, as mentioned above. In this case, the scheme member will invest the whole fund in the high risk asset at any time between joining the scheme and retirement.
EFFECT OF CHANGING THE TARGETS
We have studied the behaviour of the optimal investment strategy when the targets change. The three graphs of Figure 1 report some percentiles (5 th , 25 th , 50 th , 75 th and 95 th ), the minimum and maximum of the distribution of y t * in the cases of µ-based targets, r*-based targets and λ-based targets, when α=1.
We observe that moving from µ-based targets to λ-based targets, the optimal proportion of the portfolio to be invested in the high risk asset increases. This is evident if we look at formula (12) for y t * : it can be easily seen that the value of y t * increases as the target F t increases, everything else being equal. This is also an intuitive result, since one must increase the aggressiveness of the strategy if the target to be attained increases. 
EFFECT OF CHANGING THE DISUTILITY FUNCTION
We have studied the effect of changing the disutility function by observing the behaviour of y t * when we change the value of α and leave unchanged the value of ρ.
In all cases (i.e. for any N and any ρ) we have found that y t * increases on average as α increases. This is consistent with the fact that, the higher is α, the lower is the risk aversion of the individual, hence the riskier the investment strategy adopted.
The graphs reported in Figure 2 show how the level of the optimal investment strategy increases with α in the 2 cases ρ = -½ (on the left) and ρ = ½ (on the right) with the r*-based targets. The graphs report the mean of y t * (for t = 0, 1,…, 29) over the 1000 simulations that have been carried out. 
EFFECT OF CHANGING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ASSET RETURNS
We have studied the effect of changing the correlation factor ρ on the optimal investment strategy by comparing the behaviour of y t * when N and α are fixed and ρ changes.
We have discovered two interesting trends:
1 -in the early years of membership, the optimal allocation y t * increases as ρ increases from negative to positive values, while in the last years of membership, towards retirement, it decreases as ρ increases;
2 -apart from the early years of membership, the standard deviation of y t * increases as ρ increases.
The graphs in Figure 3 show the optimal investment strategy for the different values of ρ (-1, -½, 0, ½, 1) when α = 0 (on the left) and when α = 10 (on the right). The graphs report certain percentiles (5 th , 25 th , 50 th , 75 th and 95 th ), the minimum and the maximum of the distribution of y t * over the 1000 simulations carried out. We can see that, when ρ increases from -1 to +1, the curves reporting the percentiles become steeper in their descent from 1 to 0, confirming the first trend above explained (higher values of y t * at the beginning and lower at the end when ρ increases).
An economic explanation of this feature is as follows. We observe that a strategy is well diversified if the curve y t * decreases gradually towards zero, less diversified if the curve decreases steeply towards zero. When ρ is low, in the range (-1, -½), there is negative correlation between the asset returns and it is convenient to diversify the portfolio between the assets and, therefore, the optimal investment allocation leads to a fraction to be invested in the riskier asset which decreases very gradually towards zero. When ρ is high, in the range (½, 1), there is positive correlation between the asset returns and the diversification effect is not so rewarding, so the portfolio can be invested more heavily either in the riskier or in the less risky asset, leading the optimal investment allocation to decrease steeply towards zero.
The graphs in Figure 4 show how the standard deviation of y t * changes in value when ρ increases.
When α = 0, the standard deviation increases as ρ increases. This feature is also observed in Figure   3 : with negative values of ρ, the percentiles tend to stabilise around a certain percentage (30-40%),
while with positive values of ρ the percentiles are more spread between 0 and 1.
An economic explanation of this feature is the following. When ρ increases from -1 to +1, the benefits of diversification decrease, pushing y t * upwards. On the other hand, with high positive values of ρ, the investor needs more hedging in order to achieve the target at time N and this factor pushes y t * downwards. The value of the optimal investment allocation will be high or low depending on which of these two effects is dominating (and this depends only on the returns experienced in the past), leading the values to be more spread and the standard deviation to be higher. For higher values of α , for example α =10, the optimal asset allocation y t * increases and the balance between these two effects is different.
This phenomenon seems to indicate that, with negative correlation between the asset returns, the investment strategy is more stable on average than for the case of positive correlation, where it remains on almost the same level regardless of the past experience of asset returns. This feature may be interesting from the pension scheme investment manager's point of view in two respects:
firstly, when he/she considers projections and plans regarding the investment strategy to be adopted over a long period in the future, and, secondly, considering the fact that, in the real world, portfolios tend to be invested in assets with returns that are negatively correlated.
The detailed results for y t * indicate that they are relatively insensitive to small changes in ρ . This corresponds to the results of Chopra and Ziemba (1993), who find that optimal asset allocation results are much more sensitive to errors in means than to errors in variances and much more sensitive to errors in variances than to errors in covariances. This finding is particularly apparent as the risk aversion of the investor reduces -this corresponds here to increases in the value of α . 
RESULTS: THE DOWNSIDE RISK
THE MEANING OF α
Before consideration of the results, it is worth recalling that α can be given two meanings in our model. On the one hand, as we have already seen, it is a measure of the risk profile of the individual with the disutility function C t : the higher is its value, the less risk averse is the individual. On the other hand, it is a measure of the aggressiveness of the optimal investment strategy. In fact, if we look at the formula that determines y* t above, (12), we can easily observe that it depends directly on α, so that we have an increasing y* t with α increasing. Therefore, a low value of α indicates a cautious investment strategy, while a higher value of α indicates a riskier investment strategy. It is clear that these two viewpoints are consistent with each other.
THE DIFFERENT RISK MEASURES
In Figure 5 , we have plotted the three different risk measures considered against the different values of α in the case of 30 years, r*-targets and ρ = 0.
We observe the following results: a) the probability of failing the target decreases as α increases; b) the mean shortfall increases slightly as α increases; c) the VaR at 5% level is relatively stable as α increases.
The explanation for a) and b) is the following. Lower values of α lead to more cautious strategies, which lead to a greater number of failures but to more limited "losses" when a failure occurs. In contrast, higher values of α lead to riskier strategies and to a higher mean and a higher standard deviation of the distribution of both b N and N b , and this leads to a smaller number of failures (due to a higher mean) but slightly greater deviations from target when a failure occurs. This arises because the higher mean and standard deviation lead to a much longer right tail of the distribution of the net replacement ratio and to a slightly longer left tail of the distribution, with the lowest percentiles being smaller, so that a slightly greater mean shortfall results (as α increases).
The explanation for c) is the following: the VaR at 5% level remains stable because of the combined and opposing effects of the higher mean and standard deviation of the distribution of b N and N b , as α increases, and the net effect is to lead to the lower percentiles remaining fairly stable. 
THE DIFFERENT TARGETS AND THE RISK MEASURES
In Figures 6, 7 A general result that comes out of the graphs is that, by increasing the targets (ie moving down the page from µ-based targets to λ-based targets), the levels of all of the risk measures increase. This is an intuitive result, as it is more difficult to reach higher targets than lower ones. Furthermore, as we move down the page, the optimal investment strategy becomes riskier, since y* t increases as the target values of F t increase (see section 4.2).
Another general result is that, for very high values of α, in all of the graphs, the risk measures tend to stabilise themselves, leading to the curves becoming approximately horizontal. As mentioned before, this is a feature of the model: since short selling is not allowed and since increasing the value of α will increase the riskiness of the strategy, after a certain value of α the value of y* t will be always 1. This leads to the same strategy regardless of the rates of return that have been simulated (in which all the fund is invested in the high risk asset at any time), and hence to very small differences in the results, and therefore to the flat curves displayed in Figures 6-8 for the risk measures at extreme values of α.
We also find (in results not shown here) that the value of α after which y* t reaches1 increases with the time to retirement N, and this suggests that the choice of α for different durations should be different. This also reflects the intuitive fact that, with a short time to retirement, an individual is more risk averse so that α takes low values, while, with a long time to retirement, an individual is less risk averse so that α takes high values.
We now analyse the different figures separately.
Probability of failing the target.
The three graphs of Figure 6 report the probability of failing the target with the three different targets. We observe the following points:
1 -when we consider the initial values of the probability of failing the target in the two cases of b 30 and b 30 t, when α=0, we see that this probability is higher for b 30 t than for b 30 in the case of µ-based targets (with an approximate 10% gap), whereas it is lower for b 30 t than for b 30 in the case of the r*-based (with an approximate 10% gap) and λ-based targets (with an approximate 20% gap). The fact that the probability of failing the target is higher for b 30 t than for b 30 may not be a surprise, as it arises from the fact that the magnitude of b 30 is affected by the investment risk only, whereas the magnitude of b 30 t is affected by both the investment and annuity risk. What may seem strange is the fact that the probability of failing the target is lower for b 30 t than for b 30 with the r*-and λ-based targets. A possible explanation for this is given by looking at the aggressiveness of the strategy in the considered cases. In the case of the µ-based targets, the α=0 strategies are very cautious, so the fund is likely to be invested more in the low risk asset during membership and entirely in the low risk asset just before retirement (because of the lifestyle profile shown by the optimal values of y* t ), so that the reason for failing the target is likely to be mainly due to poor performance of the low risk asset, either during the period of membership and/or just before retirement. On the other hand, in the case of the r*-and λ-based targets, the strategies are riskier and the reason for failure may depend also on the adverse performance of the high risk asset. When this happens, there are cases in which the poor performance of the high risk asset leads to a failure regarding the achievement of b 30 , but not to a failure regarding the achievement of b 30 t due to the good performance of the low risk asset prior to retirement (leading to a more favourable annuity conversion rate than the one used in the b 30 case). The gap between the probabilities values becomes larger when moving from the r*-to λ-based targets as the strategies become riskier and the weight attaching to the adverse performance of the high risk asset increases;
2 -the descent of the probability curve is steeper for the b 30 case than for the b 30 t one. This is probably to be explained by referring to the annuity risk and the aggressiveness of the strategies.
Moving from the left to the right in each of the graphs, the value of α increases and the strategy becomes more aggressive. The increased aggressiveness of the strategy affects the general level of the final fund f N which increases, but does not affect the values of the simulated µ t in the final years before retirement, which are used (by the insurance company) to price the annuity in the case of b 30 t. We observe that, in the case of b 30 , failures are only due to the low value of f N in relation to the target F N , whereas in the case of b 30 t, failures are due also to the low value of the simulated µ t in the final years before retirement. Therefore, acting on the general level of the final fund f N will have a greater effect on the probability of failing the target in the b 30 case, because we are reducing the impact of the only cause of failures in the b 30 case (but only one of the 2 causes in the b 30 t case), and this leads to a steeper decrease in the probability curve.
These two features explain the shape of the curves in Figure 6 and the fact that in the last 2 graphs (r*-and λ-based targets) the b 30 and the b 30 t curves exhibit a cross-over.
Mean shortfall.
The three graphs of Figure 7 report the mean shortfall with the three different targets. We observe the following points: in the last 5 years before retirement (also noting that failure depends heavily on the return of the low risk asset, due to the lifestyle strategy adopted and cautiousness of the strategy), and this leads to bigger deviations for b 30 t and therefore a bigger mean shortfall;
VaR at 5% confidence.
The three graphs of Figure 8 report the VaR at 5% confidence with the three different targets. We observe the following points: However, the lower quantiles are relatively stable (and these, of course, directly affect the VaR estimates), representing the net effect of 2 conflicting influences -distributions with increasing means and increasing spreads about the means.
FIGURE 6: PROBABILITY OF FAILING THE TARGET
Probability of failing the target (lambda) 
EFFECT OF CHANGING CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ASSET RETURNS
Up to now (in Figures 5-8 ) the downside risk borne by the member has been analysed in the case of uncorrelated assets, i.e. ρ=0. Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Figures 9 and 10 report the different results relative to the three risk measures when we let the correlation factor vary from ρ = −1 to ρ = 1 (for a term of 30 years and r*-based targets).
We observe that, when ρ changes, there are very small changes in the behaviour of the three risk measures. This phenomenon is to be explained by considering the behaviour of the optimal investment strategies: the optimal investment strategy changes very little when the correlation factor ρ varies, and this is due to the small influence of the coefficient ρ on y t * (consider formula (12) above), compared to the much larger influence of other factors like α and the targets F t . As noted earlier, a similar result has been found by Chopra and Ziemba (1993) in respect of covariances. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have investigated the financial risks in a defined contribution pension scheme, considering the investment risk borne by the member during the accumulation period up to retirement and the annuity risk arising when the fund is converted into an annuity at retirement.
We have analysed the investment allocation and the downside risk faced by the retiring member, where optimal investment strategies (derived from the dynamic programming approach of Vigna and Haberman (2001)) have been adopted. The behaviour of the optimal investment strategy has been analysed allowing for changes in the disutility function (via the parameter α ). Three different risk measures have been considered in analysing the final net replacement ratios achieved by the member: the probability of failing the target, the mean shortfall and a Value at Risk type measure.
We have considered the relationship between the risk aversion of the member and these different risk measures in order to understand better the choices confronting different categories of scheme member.
We have also considered the case of a 2 assets portfolio, where the asset returns are correlated and consider the sensitivity of the results to the level of the correlation coefficient, ρ .
The main results of our investigation are the following:
• The optimal investment strategy to be adopted by a risk averse member of a defined contribution pension scheme is the so-called lifestyle strategy, which consists in investing the whole fund in high risk assets at the beginning of the membership, and then switching into low risk assets some years prior to retirement. The point in time when the switch occurs depends on both the risk aversion of the individual (the more risk averse, the sooner the switch) and the time to retirement (the longer the membership, the later the switch).
• The optimal investment strategy for a risk neutral member (for whom α → ∞) of a defined contribution pension scheme is to invest the whole fund in high risk assets for the whole period of membership, and never switch into low risk assets.
• The different risk measures of the downside risk faced by the member of a defined contribution pension scheme give different and contradictory indications.
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• Looking at the results for the probability of failing the target, the conclusion seems to be that increasing the risk aversion of the individual or (which is the same) adopting more cautious strategies leads to greater number of failures relative to a target chosen a priori.
• Looking at the results for the mean shortfall, the conclusion seems to be that increasing the risk aversion of the individual or (which is the same) adopting more cautious strategies leads to slightly lower mean shortfall, which means more limited reductions to pensioner income when a failure occurs.
• Looking at the VaR results, we note that the VaR at 1%, 5% and 10% level does not change very much when changing the risk aversion of the individual.
• The effect of changing the correlation factor ρ between the assets is very small both on the optimal investment strategy and on the downside risk borne by the member of the scheme.
We suggest that the risk profile of the individual and the trade-off between different risk measures of the downside risk borne by the member (for example, the number of failures and size of failures in respect of a certain target), are important factors to be taken into consideration when determining the choice of investment strategies in defined contribution pension schemes.
